LAW
Because of the complexity of some of the material in this work, several sections are preceded by a summary. This summary does not attempt to explain everything, but to give an introduction to the study ahead.
In studying law in general, we will rely mainly on the Summa of St. Thomas, I-II, Questions 90-108.
1. Law is an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by an authority and promulgated. (Q-90, A-4.) Anything not possessing these four marks is not a law; and therefore, does not bind.
2. There are four kinds of law: eternal, natural, human, and divine.
3. The eternal law is unchangeable, from which all laws proceed. It is imprinted on our souls, so that ignorance is impossible.
4. The natural law is a rational creature's participation in the eternal law; and therefore, is the eternal law. It is also unchangeable and written on our hearts. The Commandments are a written statement of the basic tenets of the natural law.
5. Divine law is ordered to our salvation; and therefore, is of necessity to us. Divine law governs our internal actions, as well as some external actions, and binds our conscience.
6. Human law is the only changeable law, because its source (man) is fallible and can err.
7. Human law governs only those actions which are public and not what is thought, but only actions which are seen.
8. Human law does not regulate against every evil. Therefore, the absence of prohibition by law does not render an act good.
9. A human ordinance is only a law if it is, (a) an ordinance of reason, (b) which is for the common good, (c) made by him who has care for the community, and (d) promulgated or made known to the governed.
10. The natural law supersedes human law, rendering any contrary human law actually a perversion of law; and therefore, not binding on the governed.
11. Law is to be steady and unchanging in the main, because the intention is for a permanent society which shall last through many generations with order.
12. Law binds under pain of sin, mortal or venial, depending on the gravity of the offense.
13. The "necessity knows no law" principle, applies only to human laws on a case-by-case basis.
14. The 1917 Code is merely a codification of the former laws with a few minor corrections.
15. If the law is clear, then you are bound by it.
16. The external forum is those things which are done in a manner so as to become public. It must be remembered that an action in the presence of only six people is considered public and in the external forum. The external forum is the forum of visible actions.
17. The internal forum is the forum of the soul. The internal forum are those things which are and will remain occult or secret. The internal forum consists of the Sacramental forum of Confession and the non-sacramental forum.
18. Canon law deals mainly with the external forum and evidence which is known publicly, even if contrary to what is in a man's soul.
19. In canon law, the term "offense" implies an external and morally imputable violation of a law, to which at least an indeterminate sanction is attached. (Canon 2195.)
20. Latae sententiae penalties are those penalties which are inflicted on a person who has committed an offense in a public manner. For instance, a person commits an offense which is punished by ipso facto (by the very fact), excommunication. The person excommunicates himself by violating the law.
21. We are bound by canon law, and the penalties prescribed by canon law.
22. In conclusion, ignorance of the law or of the facts does not excuse from offenses and penalties, unless and until ignorance is proven!
ST. THOMAS ON LAW
Before discussing canon law in particular, it is good to have a general understanding of the Church's teaching on law in general. Obviously, the Church is going to understand Her own law in the same way She teaches about law in general. St. Thomas Aquinas devotes 18 Questions in his Summa Theologica (I-II, Questions 90-108) to the discussion of this subject. The following material is quoted from that treatise, with a few comments added for clarity: "Thus, from the four preceding articles, the definition of law may be gathered, and it is nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community and promulgated." (Q-90, A-4.) ("Q" means Question and "A" means Article. If a reply to an objection is quoted from, it is listed simply as Reply.) Let us take a quick look at each of the four points St. Thomas makes. ..."On the contrary, Isidore says, "laws are enacted for no private profit, but for the common benefit of the citizens." (Q-90, A-4.) "Consequently, since law is chiefly ordained to the common good, any other precept in regard to some individual work, must needs be devoid of the nature of a law, save insofar as it regards the common good." Therefore, every law is ordained to the common good.
"On the contrary," Isidore says, "a law is an ordinance of the people, whereby something is sanctioned by the elders, together with the commonality." (A-3.) "I answer that, properly speaking, law regards first and foremost the order to the common good. Now, to order anything to the common good, belongs either to the whole people, or to someone who is Viceregent of the whole people; and therefore, the making of a law belongs either to the whole people, since in all other matters the directing of anything to the end concerns him to whom the end belongs". Thus, the people, or their delegate can promulgate law for the common good.
KINDS OF LAW
(In Question 91, we proceed to the kinds of law)
Eternal Law
"On the contrary," Augustine says, "that law, which is the supreme reason, cannot be understood to be otherwise than unchangeable and eternal."
"I answer (as stated above, Q-90, A-1), "that a law is nothing else but a dictate of practical reason emanating from the ruler who governs a perfect community." (A-1.) Before we finish this quote, we should understand what a perfect society or community is. A perfect community is one that is self sufficient, or possesses all power to seek its proper end. Although the family is a society, it is not perfect, because it requires outside help. Only civil society and the Church are perfect societies; civil society having a secular end; the Church, a spiritual end; both possessing all they need to pursue that end.
"Now it is evident, granted that the world is ruled by divine Providence, as we stated in the First Part (Q-22, A-1, 2), that the whole community and the universe is governed by divine Reason. Wherefore, the very idea of the government of things in God, the ruler of the universe, has the nature of a law. And since divine Reason's concept of things is not subject to time, but is eternal according to Proverbs 8:23; therefore, it is that this kind of law must be called eternal." (A-1.)
In Question 93, St. Thomas discusses the Eternal Law in detail. "On the contrary," Augustine says, "that knowledge of the eternal law is imprinted on us." (A-2.)
"On the contrary, divine Wisdom says (Proverbs 8:15), "By Me, kings and lawgivers decree just things." But the type of divine Wisdom is eternal law, as stated above. (A-1.) Therefore, all laws proceed from the eternal law." (A-3.)
"On the contrary," Augustine says, "nothing evades the laws of the most high creator and governor, for by Him the peace of the universe is administered." (A-6.)
The eternal law, being eternal, is unchangeable and binds all men. Furthermore, it is the root source of other kinds of law. Knowledge of the eternal law is imprinted on our souls; therefore, ignorance of the eternal law is impossible.
Natural Law
"'The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us;' thus; implying that the light of natural reason whereby, we discern natural law, is nothing else than an imprint of the divine light. It is therefore evident, that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation in the eternal law." (Q-91, A-2.) The natural law then is the eternal law.
"On the contrary," Augustine says, "Thy law is written in the hearts of men, which iniquity itself effaces not. But the law, which is written in men's hearts is the natural law.
Therefore, the natural law cannot be blotted out." (Q-94, A-6.)
"On the contrary," it is said in The Decretals...: "The natural law dates from the creation of the rational creature. It does not vary according to time, but remains unchangeable." (Q-94, A-5.) This is important to remember. The natural law is an unchangeable, solid rule for all times, all nations, and all peoples. "On the contrary," Isidore says, "the natural law is common to all nations." (Q-94, A-4.)
"On the contrary, the Apostle (Romans 2:14) says that, "the Gentiles who have not the law, do by nature, those things that are of the law;" which must be understood of things pertaining to good morals. Therefore, all the moral precepts of the law belong to the law of nature." (Q-100, A-1.) The moral precepts of the law are the commandments. In fact, the commandments are a restatement of the major precepts of the natural law with one notable exception. The Third Commandment specifies the exact manner God is to be worshipped, which in the natural law is left undefined. Therefore, the commandments bind everyone.
Before we treat of human law, we shall treat of divine law, although St. Thomas does not follow this order in the Summa.
Divine Law
"I answer that besides the natural and the human law, it was necessary for the directing of human conduct to have a divine law. And this for four reasons: First, because it is by law that man is directed how to perform his proper acts in view of his last end. And, indeed, if man were ordained to no other end than that which is proportionate to his natural faculties, there would be no need for man to have any further direction on the part of his reason, besides the natural and the human law, which is derived from it. But since man is ordained to an end of eternal happiness, which is inproportionate to man's natural faculty, as stated above (Q-5, A-5); therefore, it was necessary that besides natural and the human law, man should be directed to his end by a law given by God.
"Secondly, because on account of the uncertainty of human judgment, especially on contingent and particular matters, different people form different judgments on human acts; whence, that man may know without any doubt what he ought to do and what he ought to avoid, it was necessary for man to be directed in his proper acts by a law given by God, for it is certain that such a law cannot err." (Q-91, A-4.) First, we must note, that divine law cannot err, cannot be in error; for God, as truth, cannot err. Divine law makes our life easier, and we should thank God for this law!
"Thirdly, because man can make laws in those matters of which he is competent to judge. But man is not competent to judge of interior movements that are hidden, but only of exterior acts which appear; and yet, for the perfection of virtue, it is necessary for man to conduct himself aright in both kinds of acts. Consequently, human law could not sufficiently curb and direct interior acts, and it was necessary, for this purpose, that a divine law should supervene." (A-4.) This matter of judgment needs to be properly understood. Man cannot judge another's soul. "Judge not, lest ye be judged". However, for right order of human society, whether civil or ecclesiastical, it is of necessity that man be judge, based on external acts. In canon law, we refer to this as the external forum. (The internal forum is that of the conscience, which is only considered canonically in the matter of the Sacrament of Penance.) In the external forum, both civil society and the Church, judge, punish, and make decisions. Such is a proper exercise of their respective jurisdiction or authority. Divine law pertains to the internal forum, so that all bases are covered.
"Fourthly, because as Augustine says: "Human laws cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds, since while aiming at doing away with all evils, it would do away with many good things and would hinder the advance of the common good, which is necessary for human intercourse. In order, therefore, that no evil might remain forbidden and unpunished, it was necessary for the divine law to supervene, whereby all sins are forbidden." (A-4.) We will find in our later discussion of canon law, that not every mortal sin is punished by an ecclesiastical punishment. Some wrongly conclude that because an action is not punished, it is permissible. However, an action which has no punishment from law, can have a punishment from God; i.e., purgatory or hell. Therefore, although not punished on this earth, many things are nonetheless forbidden under pain of sin, in many cases grievous or mortal sin. The fact that there is no punishment is no indication that an action is permitted by God.
Human Law
"Human laws cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds, since while aiming at doing away with all evils, it would do away with many good things and would hinder the advance of the common good, which is necessary for human intercourse." (A4.) Nothing could be clearer. Human law is limited to those matters which tend to the common good. Unlike the eternal law and its two offshoots, natural and divine law, human law is of necessity limited, because the author of human law is also limited, unlike God, who is all-knowing and cannot err.
"These particular determinations, devised by human reasons, are called human laws, provided the other essential conditions of law be served, as stated above." (Q-90, A-2,3,4; Q-91, A-3.) Therefore, for a law to be a law, it must fit all of the conditions laid down, which we shall repeat: (1) A law is an ordinance of reason, (2) which is for the common good, (3) made by him who has care for the community, (4) and promulgated or made known to the governed.
If one of these is missing, the regulation is not a law and does not bind, for it would be beyond the competence of the lawgiver to make a regulation which is not also a law.
"On the contrary," Isidore says, "laws were made that in fear thereof, human audacity might be held in check, that innocence might be safeguarded in the midst of wickedness, and that the dread of punishment might prevent the wicked from doing harm. But these things are most necessary to mankind. Therefore, it is necessary that human laws be made." (Q-95, A-1.) "Consequently, every human law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature. But, if in any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law." (Q-95, A-2.) Therefore, the natural supersedes human law, and is therefore, not binding on the governed. This is only logical, because God, who is perfect, should take precedence over man, who is imperfect; therefore, God's perfect law should take precedence over man's imperfect laws. One must always remember our dependence on God. If this is forgotten, perversion and atrocities are the result.
"I answer, that whatever is for an end should be proportionate to that end. Now the end of law is the common good, because as Isidore says, "that law should be framed not for any private benefit, but for the common good of all the citizens; hence, human laws should be proportionate to the common good ...because the community of the state is composed for many persons, and its good procured by many actions; nor is it established to endure for only a short time, but to last for all time by the citizens succeeding one another," as Augustine says (Q-96, A-1.)
Law then, is made not for you or me, but for the good of the community or the common good. Laws made for my benefit, but not that of the community are not laws. Also, law is to be steady and unchanging in the main, because the intention is for a permanent society, which shall last through many generations with order. If law were to change yearly or even more often, confusion would certainly result. Laws should be well considered toward the ends of law and promulgated only after due consideration, not precipitously.
"I answer, that laws framed by man are either just or unjust. If they be just, they have the power of binding in conscience, from the eternal law from which they derive." (According to Proverbs 8:15: "By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things.") "Now, laws are said to be just, both from the end, when; to wit, they are ordained to the common good, and from their author; that is to say, when the law does not exceed the power of the lawgiver and from their form, when; to wit, burdens are laid on the subjects, according to an equality of portion and with a view to the common good." (Q-96, A-4.) Law binds under pain of sin, mortal or venial, depending on the gravity of the offense. For instance, the crime of murder is, of itself, a mortal sin. Running a stoplight is probably venial, although I can envision cases where it would be mortal. St. Thomas implicitly denies the Penal Law Theory, which teaches that some laws do not bind under pain of sin. The Penal Law Theory proposes that minor laws, such as parking regulations, do not bind under pain of sin; one is merely obliged to pay the penalty. However, since human law proceeds from the natural law, it binds under pain of sin, since to violate the common good is an immoral act.
"On the contrary," the apostle says (Romans 13:1), "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers". But subjection to a power seems to imply subjection to the laws framed by that power. "Therefore, all men should be subject to human law." (Q-96, A-5.) St. Thomas merely comes to the syllogistic conclusion that everyone is subject to human law. This is an obvious requirement for good order.
NECESSITY KNOWS NO LAW
This principle applies ONLY to human law and cannot be applied to eternal or divine law, which are both immutable and come from an infallible source--God. However, human law, which is from a fallible source--human reason--cannot possibly cover every eventuality. "If, however, the peril be so sudden as not to allow the delay involved in referring the matter to authority, the mere necessity brings with it a dispensation, since necessity knows no law." (Q-96, A-6.) A careful study of the necessities for using this principle is extremely important. I shall simply outline the principles set forth by St. Thomas in Article Six. "Whether he who is under a law may act beside the letter of the law;” (1) There must be a sudden risk; i.e., something requiring immediate remedy; (2) The authority, who would normally decide the course of action must be unavailable; (3) Observation of the letter of the law would be hurtful to the common good. (As we remember, to be a law, it must tend toward the common good.)
All three of these conditions must exist before one may act outside the letter of the law. "Nevertheless, it must be noted, that if the observance of the law according to the letter does not involve any sudden risk needing instant remedy, it is not useful for everyone to expound what is useful and what is not useful to the state; those alone can do this who are in authority, and who, on account of such like cases, have the power to dispense from the laws." (Q-95, A-6.) If this be the case with the state, how much more so with the Church, which is of divine foundation. It is only our opinion that this provision of St. Thomas can be applied to those canon laws, which are of purely human origin. Obviously, any canon law which is of eternal or divine origin, binds in all cases.
One last point--this principle must be used on a case-by-case basis. It is possible that within a year, two similar cases may call for the same action outside the letter of the law. But any time the letter of the law is habitually violated, then one must look to another place for justification, for necessity does not take us outside the letter of the law very often. Maybe the law in question is not a law. Maybe the law in question binds because of some principle we do not yet understand, which needs more study. In either case, any appeal to the principle "necessity knows no law" on a regular basis, is contrary to good order, the common good and the teaching of St. Thomas, and is therefore a perversion of law.
First, we must remember that all law is a mixture of eternal, natural, divine and human law. Canon law follows this and contains both divine law and human law.
We now proceed to a discussion of the Church's canon law. It is obvious that the lawmaker may provide for interpretation of the law he makes. Civil society does this and so does the Church. I do not intend to examine the intricacies of civil law, but will leave you with the principles of St. Thomas, which apply to all types of law. However, in discussing matters concerning the Church, we must know how She interprets Her own regulations.
B. INTERPRETATION OF THE 1917 CODE OF CANON LAW
Since we will be discussing such things as Vatican II and the new sacraments coming from it, we must discuss these in the light of the law that existed at that time. It is a general principle of law that one cannot apply a law made today to a case from ten years ago. So in our discussion, we cannot apply the 1983 Code of John Paul II, to the second Vatican Council of the mid-1960s. The 1983 Code and its binding force on Catholics will be discussed in a later chapter.
THE 1917 CODE AND THE OLD LAW
We are devoting some time to the discussion of canon law, its binding force and its proper interpretation. This is because there is so much confusion on this very subject.
St. Pius X, in reforming the Church, ordered a commission for the codification of canon law. Benedict XV had the privilege of confirming this codification in 1917, thus giving the Church, for the first time, an orderly code of canon law. Before this time, all canonical discussion and work was done from the various papal directives and the teachings of the fathers and doctors of the Church on various subjects. Never before had all of these laws been compiled into one orderly treatment and officially promulgated. The Holy Ghost inspired this codification to enable Catholics to be able to determine what to do in this time when one cannot trust anyone, cleric or layman, to deliver the truth. We must do the work ourselves, because if we approach five people for an opinion, we will return with five opinions, none of which agree.
What then, was this codification? Was this codification an abrogation of all of the laws that existed previously? The first part of the code answers this question for us. We shall quote pertinent canons:
"In reference to the former canon law, the code states that, as a rule, the old discipline is retained, though there are some modifications of the old law...." (Canon 6.) (All quotes are from Fr. Stanislaus Woywod's, A Practical Commentary on the Code of Canon Law. Fr. Woywod wrote this superb commentary, as well as over 100 articles on canonical subjects in Homiletic and Pastoral Review, which we shall also refer to on occasion.) This Canon proceeds to lay down in detail how to relate the 1917 Code to the old law. Basically, where the 1917 law is the same as the old law, the old interpretation is to be retained. If there is a change, then the law is to be interpreted according to the proper meaning of the terms employed. If a law only partially changes a law, then the old interpretation is used for that which is unchanged. Paragraph four of Canon 6 provides: "In case of doubt whether some provision of the canons differ from the old law, one must adhere to the old law." The old law retains its importance. The 1917 Code was mainly an orderly codification, not a radical departure from the 1900 years of law that preceded it. The most radical changes from the old law are found in paragraphs five and six of Canon 6. Paragraph five abolishes all ecclesiastical penalties not mentioned in the Code. Paragraph six abolishes all disciplinary laws which are not from approved liturgical books, which Canon 2 retains in full force, or which are from laws derived from the natural or positive divine law. Therefore, disciplinary laws which are based on natural or positive divine law, retain their full force, although they may not be mentioned in the Code. This comes from the principle that there is no dispensation from such laws.
As Cardinal Cicognani writes in his work, Canon Law, the 1917 Code contains some 26,000 citations from old law, including 8,400 from the Decree of Gratian; 1,200 from ecumenical councils; 4,000 from papal constitutions; 11,200 from the Roman Curia; and some 800 from liturgical books." Some 26,000 citations from the old Jaw are contained in only 2,414 canons.
One can easily see that there was no real change in Church law, merely a codification. The 1917 Code is basically a restatement of the old law, with a few minor changes, corrections and clarifications. A total of 1,200 of those citations are from the councils, which we are bound to follow, even if their law was not written anywhere else.
To qualify for the degree of Doctor of Canon Law, one must write a dissertation on some point of canon law. The Catholic University of America has printed over 250 of these dissertations by candidates for Doctor of Canon Law. A typical dissertation will take one canon and trace its history and its interpretation throughout the centuries. Usually, a dissertation is divided into two parts. The first part is a history of Church legislation on the point. This first part would be of no use if the law did away with the interpretation before 1917. The second part, based on the first part, provides the current interpretation of the Canon in detail. This part goes into what parts have changed and what parts remain the same, giving practical help in applying the Canon to questions which arise.
It is important to remember that canon law is not merely ecclesiastical law. In some cases, a canon, such as Canon 802 ("Priests only have the power to offer the sacrifice of the Mass"), the law is actually infallible Church teaching. So, in canon law, we have regulations from infallible Church teaching, divine law, natural law and ecclesiastical law. This is yet another reason that the old interpretation is retained, because infallible teaching, divine law and natural law are immutable and unchangeable.
Canon 20 also refers us, in part, to the old interpretation, "If there is no explicit provision concerning some affair, either in the general or in the particular law, a norm of action is to be taken from laws given in similar cases, from general principles of law applied with the equity proper to canon law, from the common and constant teaching of doctors." The common and constant teaching of doctors is a direct reference to the constant interpretation of canon law. So we conclude this part of our discussion with the conclusion that the 1917 Code of Canon Law, is mainly a codification and not a change in the law, but a continuation of law.
HOW IS CANON LAW INTERPRETED?
With Canon 20, we can begin a discussion of the proper interpretation of canon law. The proper interpretation of canon law is extremely important to understanding the current situation in the Church. The gross misinterpretation of two words in one Canon has led to a whole schismatic sect from the Catholic Church. Canon 6 provides our first manner of interpretation by referring us to the interpretation of all laws that are unchanged, which has always been held by the Church. Canon 20 leads us to filling in the cracks which canon law has left. St. Thomas rightly observes that no one can legislate for each and every situation, so canon law provides for a method of handling the situation which is not covered by the Code. Canon 20 gives us four places to look:
1. Laws in similar cases.
2. General principles of law. This would refer to St. Thomas' principles discussed above, which is the basis of our own thinking in the Church.
3. Practice of the Roman Curia. This refers to all those decrees and answers to questions put to Rome on a variety of subjects. Many of these are found in English in a set of books, the Canon Law Digest. This way, when in doubt, one stays with the mind of the Church as expressed by Her decisions.
4. Common and constant teaching of the doctors, which I consider an indirect reference to Canon 6.
"Laws made for the purpose of safeguarding the public against common danger bind, even if in a particular case there is no danger." (Canon 21.) This is probably the most important canon to keep in mind today. Many happily go out into dangerous territory, when this is against the spirit of canon law and Church teaching. We are to avoid the near occasions of sin; and therefore, logically, the near occasions of violating Church law, which binds us under pain of sin.
"Laws are authoritatively interpreted by the lawmaker, his successor, and by those to whom the lawmaker has committed the power to interpret laws. The authoritative interpretation of the law given in the form of a law has the same force as the law itself " (Canon 17.) Only the lawmaker can give an authoritative interpretation of law. In the case of canon law, the lawmaker is the Pope. The Pope has designated certain Roman congregations to also give authoritative interpretations. Canon lawyers, theologians, bishops, priests and others cannot so interpret. Of course, if a theologian or anyone else quotes such an interpretation, the interpretation is authoritative, although the theologian's commentary is not.
"The ecclesiastical laws are to be interpreted according to the proper meaning of the terms of the law considered in their context. If the meaning of the terms remains doubtful or obscure, one must have recourse to parallel passages of the code (if there are any), or to the purpose of the law and its circumstances and the intention of the lawgiver." (Canon 18.) If a law is clear, then you are bound. There is no need to go to the next provision of this Canon. For instance, Canon 159 states: "The appointment to any office is to be made in writing." This law is clear. If an Ordinary appoints a man pastor, he must do so in writing. There is no reason to question this. Only if the law is unclear does one proceed to parallel canons and the mind of the lawgiver.
"Laws which decree a penalty, or restrict the free exercise of one's rights, or establish an exception from the law, must be interpreted in a strict sense." (Canon 19.) When dealing with penalties, we must be strict about any interpretation. If there is a doubt, and there are two possible interpretations, the strict one must be adhered to.
Thus ends our discussion of the canons on interpretation, which are Canons 17-21. There is nothing else to consider here. The matter is simple. Obviously, any fanciful interpretation of law which bears only a remote resemblance to the actual law, is forbidden. Despite this fact, many go this far and further.
OTHER PRINCIPLES
There are several other important principles we should consider now, as they will apply to our later discussion of canon law and the current Church situation.
Canon law deals with those things which are in what we call the "external forum." The external forum embraces those things which are done in a manner so as to become public. If I do something in the presence of one person who will likely broadcast it to the world, I do it publicly in the external forum. More precisely, the external forum deals with those things which are not in the internal forum. The internal forum are those things which are and will remain occult or secret.
The internal forum consists of the sacramental forum of confession and the non-sacramental forum (which consists of private actions), which will not become publicly known. It must be remembered that an action in the presence of only six people is considered public and in the external forum. Although canon law mainly deals with the external forum, there are several canons which deal with the internal forum. These are usually a reminder of the divine law on a certain subject, such as the requirement for a person to be in the state of grace to receive Holy Communion.
We should look at several principles concerning offenses and censures, because these are largely misunderstood. "In canon law, the term 'offense' implies an external and morally imputable violation of a law, to which at least an indeterminate sanction is attached." (Canon 2195.) An offense is a violation of law which is punished in some manner. "An offense is public if it has been divulged or if it was committed under or attended by such circumstances that its divulgation may and must be prudently considered easily possible." (Canon 2197, par. 1.)
"The imputability of an offense depends on the evil will of the delinquent, or on the extent to which his ignorance of the violated law or his omission of proper diligence was culpable. Wherefore, all causes which increase, diminish or destroy the evil will or culpability, automatically increase, diminish, or destroy the imputability of the offense." (Canon 2199.) Imputability means the guilt associated with and its application to the person. Since an offense is a sin, this Canon deals with this relationship in determining whether a person was actually guilty. An offense happens when some person violates the law. In Moral Theology, we have two points to consider. In considering a law, whether divine, natural or ecclesiastical, the commission of a sin is considered in two ways. The first way considers whether a law has been broken and a sin committed. This is called objective. Objectively, if a person commits a murder, he has committed a sin. Whether a person is actually in conscience guilty, depends on subjective matters. Was he sane or insane, ignorant, forced, etc. The Church goes into these matters with two things in mind. The first is for an ecclesiastical trial, should the matter get that far, and; secondly, to remind people of the moral law on the subject.
However, the Church herself only looks at the external forum. "Given the external violation of a law, the evil will is presumed in the external forum until the contrary is proved." (Canon 2200, par. 2.) If an offense is objectively committed, then the evil will is presumed until the contrary is proven. Therefore, we are required to presume the offense was committed willingly and the resultant penalties are incurred, according to the law, until the contrary is proven. Many accuse the Church of judging, which She is not doing in the sense in which Christ condemned judging. No one states that the person committed a sin and is on a straight course to hell. This is not the province of canon law. Canon law is for the good of the Church, and deals with what is seen. The internal forum is the forum of the soul. The external forum is the forum of visible actions. All the Church says, is that an offense was committed; and therefore, externally the person is guilty. The matter of sin is for the confessional; the matter of penalties is for the Church to decide, based on what is seen and known publicly, as She defines it.
"A penalty latae sententiae, whether medicinal or vindictive, automatically (ipso facto) binds the offender in both the internal and external forum, if he is conscious of his offense." (Canon 2232, par. 1.) (Binding in the internal forum means that if he is forbidden to say Mass, for instance, he may not do so, even in private.) "A penalty is called latae sententiae, if a specific penalty is attached to a law or a precept in such a manner that it is incurred ipso facto (by the very fact) by the commission of the offense"(Canon 2217, par. 2.) If you commit the offense, then you incur the penalty by your action of committing the crime. In actual fact, only you can excommunicate yourself. The Church may, for Her own good, declare what you have done to yourself in this case.
"Persons who are bound by a law or precept are liable to the penalty attached to the law or precept, unless they are explicitly exempted." (Canon 2226.) "Laws which are purely ecclesiastical in their nature do not bind; (1) unbaptized persons, (2) baptized persons who do not have sufficient use of reason, (3) children under seven years of age, unless the law explicitly states otherwise." (Canon 12.) Therefore, ecclesiastical laws bind each and every baptized person, unless the law explicitly states otherwise. We are all bound by the law if we claim to be Catholic!
We shall go into more detail on offenses in the section on heresy. We would like to make one final statement: Ignorance of the law or of the facts does not excuse from offenses and penalties, unless and until ignorance is proven!
Michael Fighting
